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Universal Serial Bus (USB) Flash Drives are nowadays one of the most convenient and diffused means to
transfer files, especially when no Internet connection is available. However, USB flash drives are also one of
the most common attack vectors used to gain unauthorized access to host devices. For instance, it is possible to
replace a USB drive so that when the USB key is connected, it would install passwords stealing tools, root-kit
software, and other disrupting malware. In such a way, an attacker can steal sensitive information via the
USB-connected devices, as well as inject any kind of malicious software into the host.
To thwart the above-cited raising threats, we propose MAGNETO, an efficient, non-interactive, and privacy-
preserving framework to verify the authenticity of a USB flash drive, rooted in the analysis of its unintentional
magnetic emissions. We show that the magnetic emissions radiated during boot operations on a specific host
are unique for each device, and sufficient to uniquely fingerprint either the brand and the model of the USB
flash drive, or the specific USB device, depending on the used equipment. Our investigation on 59 different USB
flash drives—belonging to 17 brands, including the top brands purchased on Amazon in mid-2019—, reveals
a minimum classification accuracy of 98.2% in the identification of the brand and the model, accompanied
by a negligible time and computational overhead. MAGNETO can also identify the specific USB Flash drive,
with a minimum classification accuracy of 91.2%. Overall, MAGNETO proves that unintentional magnetic
emissions can be considered as a viable and reliable means to fingerprint read-only USB flash drives. Finally,
future research directions in this domain are also discussed.
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Protection.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Universal Serial Bus (USB) standard is nowadays the most convenient, cheap, and widespread
means to physically connect peripheral devices to workstations and laptops [21]. Over the last
years, the USB standard replaced a large number of earlier interfaces, including serial and parallel
ports, used to supply either power or data connectivity to external devices, thus providing a unique
and standardized interface to be used for the connection of any peripheral board. In addition, the
ongoing introduction of the USB 3.0 standard specification is further widening the application
scenarios where USB connections are suitable, thanks to transfer speeds up to 5 Gbps and a
maximum storage capacity of 1 TB [25]. As a result, USB connectivity is more and more used
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by companies in industrial environments to transfer data between devices, as well as to charge
electrical components [35].
The widespread diffusion of USB connections is confirmed by the increasing market size asso-
ciated with the new wave of USB 3.0 devices. According to Transparency Market Research, the
worldwide market for USB 3.0 drives is growing at a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of
roughly 23.5% over the last years, reaching 3.1 billion US$ in 2020, from 1.1 billion US$ in 2015. At
the same time, USB devices are getting cheaper: the average price of a USB drive in China decreased
from 6.7 USD/Unit in 2011 to 6.0 USD/Unit in 2016, and a further decreasing trend is expected in
the upcoming years [52].
Despite the provided advantages, the USB standard communication interface also poses increasing
concerns from the security perspective [30]. Being focused on boosting the availability of connected
peripherals and on reducing the latency in accessing remotely stored data, the USB software design
paid little attention to security issues. Exploiting such a weak security barrier, many attacks and
vulnerabilities emerged over the last few years [28].Indeed, malicious attackers have been able
to modify the firmware of specific (faulty) USB flash drives, turning them into a vector to launch
tools for information stealing, host system impairment, Internet traffic redirection, and malware
injection, to name a few [29], [27]. As reported by the latest media and newspapers, USB attacks
are very likely to happen especially when the target system is not connected to the Internet, such
as in the case of ships, remote keyless entry systems, and critical infrastructures [11], [43].
While a few countermeasures have been provided in the literature—mainly based on standard
anti-malware software—attackers are still able to escape the detection, e.g., by masquerading
the malicious USB device as a legitimate one at the time of connection to the host [50]. Even if
the forthcoming USB Type-C standard enhanced the security guarantees via digital certificates,
installing and verifying such certificates into regular USB 2.0 and 3.0 devices would lead to a
complete software and hardware redesign of the interfaces, thus being invasive and hard to be
deployed. Especially in industrial companies and critical infrastructure scenarios, the impact of
such attacks can be devastating, preventing the daily activities of the company and possibly leading
to huge economic losses on the whole country relying on the target critical infrastructure.
To provide an effective tool for the detection of malicious USB devices, in this paper we present
MAGNETO, a framework able to identify replaced and faulty USB flash drives connected to a specific
host, based on unintentional magnetic emissions radiated by the USB boards, during the execution
of the boot procedure. We show that the magnetic emissions radiated at very low frequencies by
USB flash drives immediately after the connection to a specific host system are consistent and
unique, i.e., they show the same profile over time, and they are specific to the model and version
of the analyzed device. Thus, such low-frequencies magnetic emissions can be effectively used to
achieve both a method for USB brand and model identification and a physical-layer fingerprinting
mechanism for USB devices—hence providing a powerful tool to spot the replacement or malicious
corruption of the authorized USB flash drive.
Our experimental campaign took into consideration 59 different USB devices, including the
top brands purchased on Amazon in July 2019, and it revealed impressive performances. When
deployed using low-cost Software Defined Radios (SDRs), MAGNETO reaches up to 98.2% of
accuracy in correctly identifying the brand and model of the device, after an observation time of
only 1.08 seconds. When the identification of the single USB flash drive is crucial, such as in critical
infrastructures, using a wide-band spectrum analyzer MAGNETO can discriminate the specific
USB device connected to a given host with a minimum accuracy of the 91.2%. Such outstanding
performances require only minor computations on a commercial laptop, further confirming the
viability of MAGNETO.
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It is worth noting that MAGNETO could be extended also beyond the execution of the boot
procedure. In fact, by just extending the time duration of the observation window, it could be
possible to monitor the activities of the USB flash drive when it is in the idle state, thus detecting
any asynchronous (potentially malicious) activities originated by the USB device.
MAGNETO, though being of general applicability, could benefit those environments interested in
strictly protecting the access to sensitive equipment—such as critical infrastructures and industrial
companies. Indeed, under the reasonable assumption that only a few (brands of) USB flash drives
are authorized (e.g., the ones distributed by the company itself), MAGNETO can be implemented
on a reference computing machine, to detect any replacement or modification of the intended USB
flash drives, further strengthening the enforcement of security policies.
We highlight that three main elements distinguish MAGNETO from previous contributions.
First, MAGNETO is the first solution to exploit the usage of unintentional magnetic emissions to
address the threats associated with malicious USB drives. Despite this feature could appear just an
application of well-known background concepts, it brings new unprecedented challenges. Indeed,
differently from other devices analyzed in the scientific literature, USB flash drives cannot be
modified (or deeply inspected) by end-users, and they should be analyzed as black-box.
Second, we prove that unintentional magnetic emissions occurring during the boot process of
a USB flash drive can be used to fingerprint its hardware, without any intervention at either
the firmware or the software level, but only requiring to plug-in the USB flash drive. Further, our
solution guarantees the full privacy of the device under test, makingMAGNETO overall enjoying the
properties of being non-invasive, minimal-interactive, and privacy-preserving, and fully-compatible
with read-only devices. To the best of our knowledge, all these features are not provided by any
other competing solution in the literature.
Finally, the open-source code and data of MAGNETO framework are available at [13]. This will
allow practitioners, industries, and academia to verify our claims, as well as to extend the adoption
of MAGNETO as a ready-to-use basis for their further software development.
The sequel of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief background on
unintentional RF and magnetic emissions, as well as an overview of USB security-related work;
Section 3 highlights the assumed scenarios and the adversary model; Section 4 provides the details
of MAGNETO; Section 5 describes the tools and the results achieved by using MAGNETO; Section 6
highlights the advantages and limitations of MAGNETO and, finally, Section 7 tightens conclusions.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
Despite being assembled in a Printed Circuit Board (PCB) through industrial-grade processes, any
embedded device produces even small unintentional magnetic emissions, emanated directly from
the integrated circuits.
The source of such emissions is mainly due to the local oscillator, that continuously emits
electromagnetic waves at a given fundamental frequency, to provide a unique timing reference
for hardware and software operations executed by the embedded device. Even being narrow-band,
the signal emitted by the oscillator creates also several harmonics, i.e., components at frequencies
multiple than the fundamental tone, characterized by a non-negligible power spectral density. Such
harmonics couple with very small integrated wires on the embedded device and create resonating
effects, that turn the wires into small antennas, emanating RF power [2]. The physical effects
underpinning these phenomena are described by the physics fundamental Maxwell equations, and
also specific mathematical models are available in the literature, describing their complex creation
[7]. On the one hand, this phenomenon can be the cause of signal interference between devices
operating close to each other. For this reason, any embedded device emitting RF signals must be
compliant to specific international regulations before being available to the commercial market
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[17]. On the other hand, unintentional magnetic emissions effectively represent a side-channel for
any embedded device, providing useful information about the nature of the device and the specific
activities executed at a given time instant [14].
To provide few examples in this direction, recently the authors in [9] provided a novel side-
channel attack on mixed-signal chips, where digital logic circuits and the radio transceiver are
coupled on the same chip. Using information leaked from digital circuits on a Nordic Semiconductor
nRF52832 chip, the authors recovered the full AES 128-bit key, up to a distance of 10 meters from
the target device. The authors in [53] and [12] identified that the fabrication process of embedded
circuits induced variations in the electrical properties of each chip. By using RF emissions from
16 different micro-controllers, they were able to identify uniquely each of them, recurring to
imperfections of the fabrication processes. Similarly, the author in [54] focused on the identification
of the SCADA sensors and actuators in critical infrastructures and measured the unintentional
emissions derived from the execution of a specific piece of code. Another application in this
context is discussed in [6], where researchers used the unintentional RF emissions to achieve the
classification and verification of IEEE 802.15.4 ZigBee wireless devices that are widely used in
critical infrastructure applications. In the context of the IEEE 802.15.4 communication technology,
unintentional RF emissions have been also investigated in [15] and [36], to build a system able to
reject rogue devices. Concerning generic RF devices, the authors in [47] demonstrated the feasibility
of fingerprinting wireless devices by looking at the non-idealities of the emitted RF signals. They
showed that each packet emitted by a device has unique distinguishing features, that can be used to
identify the transmitting entity. Indeed, we note that this fingerprinting methodology requires the
transmission of RF packets, and thus, it cannot be applied to non-RF devices, such as the USB drives.
Another use-case was introduced by the authors in [24], where unintentional RF emissions and
random noise waveforms were used to actively interrogate target microwave devices, recognize and
classify antennas and terminations. Recently, the authors in [10] used the magnetic signals radiated
by the CPU to fingerprint heterogeneous devices, including laptops, smartphones, and additional
mobile devices. This result has been achieved by precisely controlling the hardware, firmware, and
software of the devices under tests, forcing the CPU to execute a stimulation software that enables
devices fingerprinting.
A few works in the recent literature investigated the same context tackled by this contribution,
i.e., malicious USB Flash Drives, with specific reference to the BadUSB attack [50], [4], [49]. For
instance, the authors in [50] presented USBFILTER, a software solution providing first packet-level
access control for USB, and preventing unauthorized interfaces from successfully connecting to the
host Operating System (OS). The authors in [18] proposed an innovative approach, forcing the user
to interact with the connected USB device before allowing the device to be used, thus ensuring that
a real human-interface device is attached. The authors in [4] developed Cinch, a countermeasure
against malicious peripherals leveraging virtualization techniques to place the connected hardware
in a logically separate machine, as an isolation layer from the main and protected one. This layer
depends on security policies configured by the users to reject or accept interaction with connected
USB peripherals. The authors in [49] designed and implemented GoodUSB, a mediation architecture
for the Linux USB Stack. This solution defends against BadUSB attacks by enforcing permissions
based on user expectations of device functionality. Recently, the authors in [48] proposed to
authenticate individual USB devices using tamper-proof Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs),
combining multiple security technologies available in commodity PCs, e.g., Trusted Platform
Module (TPM), customized secure boot, and virtualization support. This is a software solution, that
could not help in case the specific USB brand is a regular USB stick, such as in the Scenario described
in our paper. We also report the interesting work by the authors in [5], where the firmware and
software features of the USB protocol stack are used to identify the specific host.
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On the one hand, we highlight that such solutions are specifically developed to thwart the BadUSB
attack and its behavior [31]. Today, the vendors of the devices used to carry out the BadUSB attack
have fixed the vulnerabilities, thus making the BadUSB attack very hard to be realized. On the
other hand, attackers are still able to cheat both the above defense measures and the current
anti-malware software, e.g., by masquerading the malicious USB device as a legitimate one at the
time of connection to the host [50]. Especially in industrial companies and critical infrastructure
scenarios, the impact of such attacks can be devastating, preventing the daily activities of the
company and possibly leading to huge economic losses on the whole country relying on the target
critical infrastructure.
Table 1 summarizes the above contributions, along some reference system requirements.
Table 1. Qualitative comparison of MAGNETO against competing solutions.
Ref. No Host Firmware
Modification
No Target
Modification
Compatible with
Read-Only Devices
No Radio
Operations
[9] ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
[53] ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
[12] ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
[54] ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
[6] ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
[15] ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
[36] ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
[47] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗
[24] ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
[10] ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
[50] ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
[4] ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
[49] ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
[18] ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
[48] ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
[5] ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
MAGNETO ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Table 1 highlights that a novel element characterizing MAGNETO is its application to devices
whose firmware and software is read-only, and therefore, not accessible by the verifier. Indeed, all
the previous contributions on Radio Frequency (RF) fingerprinting require either the transmission
of an RF packet by the device, e.g., an IEEE 802.11a packet in [47] and [53], or an identical sequence
of operations on known data packets in [12], or the access to the device under test, that have
to execute a specific piece of code, e.g., the Ladder Logic Program (LLP) scan in [54]. The first
class of the above-described solutions restricts the application of fingerprinting to only devices
featuring a radio. Conversely, the second class implies that the verifier has direct access to the
firmware or the software of the device under test, by deploying a firmware/software update to
allow for the fingerprinting process. Conversely, our solution exploits the unintentional magnetic
emissions of the boot process of a USB flash drive, therefore, enabling the fingerprinting process
without requiring access to either the firmware or the software in the device under test—even
when the device does not emit any RF signals. Further, our solution guarantees the full privacy of
the device under test, making MAGNETO overall enjoying the properties of being non-invasive,
minimal-interactive, and privacy-preserving.
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3 REFERENCE SCENARIOS AND ADVERSARY MODEL
In the following, we assume two reference scenarios: (i) a private company; and, (ii) a critical
infrastructure.
Scenario #1: Private Company.We consider a private company, interested in maintaining very
high levels of security and privacy for its own most important equipment and data. The employees
of the company need to use USB flash drives for daily work, e.g., to transfer files between different
equipment. Being aware of the vulnerabilities associated with the USB standard specification, the
system administrator would like to deploy a solution enabling the connection of authorized USB
devices only, i.e., brands and models that are not affected by any known vulnerability. Therefore, the
company provides to the employees its own USB flash drives, characterized by a specific brand and
model. Only the USB flash drives of this particular brand and model can be used by the employees,
while the use of any other brand or model of USB flash drive is not allowed. To enforce such a
protection strategy, the IT system administrator deploys a host device on purpose, dedicated to the
measurement and testing of specific USB Flash Drives brought into the company by the employees.
By connecting the USB Flash Drives to the host, the system administrator could verify that the
brand and the model of the USB Flash Drive are effectively the ones authorized by the company. It
is worth noting that the physical deployment of such a host device can be optimized to be located
within an electromagnetic safe zone, where the electromagnetic interference due to other devices is
limited.
Scenario #2: Critical Infrastructure.We also consider a digitized Critical Infrastructure, such as
the control center of an airport, a smart port, an electricity control station, a smart grid, or a train
station, to name a few. Being very sensitive computing centers, the computational units behind
these critical infrastructures are usually highly protected, and equipped with minimal interfacing
capabilities toward the public Internet. As such, the usage of USB Flash Drives is allowed only
for unavoidable tasks, such as the installation of critical updates to the system, or the export of
data stored locally. Indeed, such critical infrastructures can be the target of malicious attackers,
aiming at compromising the operation of a whole country by shutting down, e.g., its transportation
or electricity network. Thus, the computing equipment controlling the operation of these critical
infrastructures need to be carefully protected against any hazard, including the usage of malicious
USB Flash Drives. To enforce such a protection strategy, we assume that the system administrator
would like to use only a specific USB Flash Drive, and reject any other one, even if it is of the
same brand and model. To this aim, the system administrator could deploy a dedicated host device
for the test of the USB flash drive, and to deploy a system enabling and supporting the unique
identification of the specific USB Flash Drive. As for the previous scenario, such a host device can
be deployed where electromagnetic interference is minimal, to optimize the overall measurement
procedure.
Adversary Model.We assume an adversary that is interested in compromising the equipment of
the company or the Critical Infrastructure, by adopting malicious USB flash drives. The specific
aims of the adversary could be manifold, e.g., injecting malware into the ICT infrastructure where
the USB flash drives are connected to, redirecting the Internet traffic to malicious websites, or
stealing information stored locally in the ICT infrastructure, to name a few.
To this aim, the adversary can replace the regular (allowed) USB flash drive with another USB
flash drive, having the same external look and form factor of the previous one, but a different
hardware and/or firmware. This USB flash drive is modified on purpose to achieve one of the
objectives listed above. In addition, we also assume that the adversary can exploit weaknesses in
the USB firmware deployment and replace the legacy firmware of the USB flash drive provided by
the company, injecting its malicious version [31]. It is worth noting that in such a scenario, the
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deployment of regular anti-malware software would not be effective. Indeed, as highlighted by
previous contributions [28], attacks exploiting USB external drives can modify the firmware of the
component in such a way to appear to host devices as regular USB equipment, e.g. a keyboard.
Thus, the anti-malware would recognize the keyboard as a legitimate component and it would
grant the related permissions.
We also assume that the adversary does not have access to the source code of the firmware
deployed in a specific USB flash drive. This is confirmed by the fact that the firmware on-board of
commercial USB flash drives cannot be changed and even cannot be accessed by the end-users after
the deployment. All the hacks that are described in technical and unofficial blogs refer to particular
firmware versions of specific USB flash drives1 2. However, themanufacturers immediately withdrew
the affected devices from the market, and they updated the native firmware to fix these weaknesses.
Therefore, we believe that in the vast majority of practical cases the native firmware of commercial
USB flash drives cannot be modified by end-users.
Even in the unlikely case where an adversary can access the firmware, we consider it extremely
hard and impractical to reverse-engineer it to obtain the source code, and to re-deploy it on the same
USB flash drive. Generally, the firmware is protected by intellectual property rights, the source code
of such firmware is secret, and protected by multiple security layers deployed at manufacturing
time, and not available for public download.
Finally, we notice that the two scenarios described above always assume an end-user that could
not circumvent the deployed system, e.g., by not testing its USB flash drive before usage. This
assumption is consistent with the scenario of a benign employee, not aware of the (possible)
replacement of its USB Flash drive with a malicious one.
4 THEMAGNETO FRAMEWORK
MAGNETO consists of five different modules as depicted in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Logical architecture of the MAGNETO framework.
We identify two modes of operation:
• Training Mode. During this phase, a local database is populated with all the profiles of the
available USB devices, including the authorized ones.
• Classification Mode. This is the online operational mode ofMAGNETO, where a new unknown
USB device is tested to verify if its profile matches the one already collected during the
training mode.
The details of the modules involved in the MAGNETO framework are provided below:
• Emissions ExtractionModule.The role of this module is to detect, capture, and log unintentional
magnetic emissions from a particular device. Specifically, MAGNETO focuses on the analysis
of the unintentional magnetic emissions leaked by USB flash drives at boot time, i.e., when
the USB device is first connected to the host device and it executes boot operations. Then,
the raw data consisting of: (i) a timestamp; (ii) the acquisition frequency; and, finally, (iii) the
1https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/07/this-thumbdrive-hacks-computers-badusb-exploit-makes-devices-turn-evil/
2https://www.reddit.com/r/netsec/comments/112kuv/reprogram_usb_flash_drive_microprocessors_firmware/
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value of the Received Signal Strength (RSS) are passed to the Features Extraction Module.
The operations of the Emissions Extraction Module are carried out with particular hardware
equipment, able to capture magnetic emissions on the specific operating frequency thanks to
a suitable magnetic antenna. More details about the equipment used in our experiments will
be provided in Section 5.
• Features Extraction Module. Starting from the raw data provided by the Emissions Extraction
Module, this module is responsible for generating the features of interest for the particular
signal. Specifically, this module operates in three different phases, i.e., Data Normalization,
Regions Definitions, and Features Computation.
- Data Normalization. The data acquired by the Emissions Extraction Module are normalized
by re-centering them to the minimum value of the dynamic range of the observation, and
then, by re-scaling them by the value of their dynamic range. Specifically, assuming xi is a
sample of the distribution, and XMIN and XMAX are the minimum and the maximum value
of the dynamic range, the normalized sample xˆi is computed as: xˆi = xi−XMIN(XMAX−XMIN ) .
These operations are crucial to enable cross-comparisons between different measurements,
as they contribute to eliminate any small difference in the absolute value of the received
power—e.g., due to small misalignment of the measurement setup.
- Regions Definition. Each value of the RSS reported by the Emissions Extraction Module is
associated with a given timestamp and a specific frequency. In this phase, the Features
Extraction Module merges in the same observation vector the measurements within a given
time and frequency regions, that can be configured uniquely for any specific investigation.
The output of this phase is a matrix, containing for each identified region all the collected
RSS values for the particular experiment.
- Features Computation. Starting from the matrix created in the previous phase, the Features
Computation phase is responsible for computing the features on each observation vector.
Assuming now that X = [x1,x2, ...,xi , ...,xN ] is the observation vector containing the
normalized intensity of the acquired signal in a given time frame and frequency range,
we consider the following statistics: (i) mean; (ii) standard deviation; (iii) variance; (iv)
skewness; and, finally, (v) kurtosis, to precisely characterize the unintentional radiated
emissions from each USB device. Equations 1 and 2 report the formulas for the skewness
and kurtosis, respectively, where (X¯ ) is assumed to be the mean value of the observation
vector.
γ =
1
N
∑N
i=1(xi − X¯ )3[ 1
N−1
∑N
i=1(xi − X¯ )2
]3/2 . (1)
κ =
∑N
n=1
(
xi − X¯
)4
1
N
(∑N
n=1
(
xi − X¯
)2)2 . (2)
The output of this phase is a new matrix, containing the value of each feature for the
reference experiment.
The current matrix containing the values of the features for each time and frequency interval
can be passed either to the Training Module or the Classification Module, according to the
particular operating mode of MAGNETO.
• Training Module. This module, involved only in the Training Mode, is responsible for creating
the reference profile of the particular device under investigation, by using the features
previously identified by the Features Extraction Module. The created profile is then uploaded
to the Local Database Module.
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• Local Database Module. The local database stores information about the specific training
model associated with each device. When a new (previously unknown) device is registered,
the Training Module establishes the specific statistical model for this device, that is stored
in the Local Database Module. At the same time, when the Classification Module is executed,
the Local Database module provides the reference statistical models used for comparison and
classification.
• Classification Module. This module, involved only in the Classification Mode, is in charge of
establishing if the previously stored profiles match the one extracted from the device under
test. The comparison is carried out by considering the specific features considered by the
Features Extraction Module, and by comparing the obtained features with the stored profiles
available in the Local Database Module. The module outputs a similarity score, representing
how much the magnetic emissions collected from the device under test are similar to the
stored profile. If such a score is equal or greater than zero, the device is assumed to be
authentic. Otherwise, it is discarded. Among the several possible classifiers available in the
literature [44], in this paper, we have adopted the one-class Support Vector Machine (SVM)
classifier, since it natively fits our objectives. More details will be provided in Section 5.
Using the five modules described above, depending on the scenario and the specific objective,
either the brand and the model of the USB Flash Drive or the specific USB device can be uniquely
characterized when connected to a host device.
Wrapping up, during the Training Mode, the unintentional magnetic emissions leaked by the USB
devices are collected via the hardware equipment and the functionalities offered by the Emissions
Extraction Module. Then, the reference features are extracted from the raw signals by the Features
Extraction Module, and a reference statistical model is created by the Training Module and stored
into the Local Database Module for future use. The process is performed for a large number of
devices, to create a database containing an exhaustive number of products of the same device.
During the classification mode, all the USB devices are tested, by connecting them to a reference
host device and collecting the unintentional magnetic emissions during the boot procedures via
the functionalities offered by the Emissions Extraction Module. The reference features are computed
from the acquired signal, and then passed to the Classification Module, which provides a similarity
score, indicating how much the stored profile matches the provided one. If no correspondence is
found (i.e., the similarity score is negative), the new device is assumed as unauthorized. Instead, if
the profile of the unintentional magnetic emissions is found to be consistent with the allowed class
(i.e., the score is equal to 0 or positive), the device will be authorized.
It is worth noting that MAGNETO focuses on the boot procedures of USB devices, because they
are strictly required for the normal operations of the USB themselves. Indeed, being loaded in
the firmware, the boot procedures associated with the USB device should not be changed by a
non-malicious user. Otherwise, any modification to the firmware (either intentional or not) will
generate significant changes to the magnetic emissions during the boot procedures, indicating
therefore that the USB flash drive has been either tampered with or replaced. Such modifications of
the behavior of the USB flash drive during the boot operations can be detected by MAGNETO and
can lead to a timely rejection of the device. More details on the specific modifications that can be
done when tampering with USB devices are provided in Section 6.
5 EXPERIMENTAL ASSESSMENT
In this section, we provide the details of our experimental campaign, aimed at measuring the
performance of MAGNETO for the classification of either the brand and model of USB flash drives,
or the specific USB flash drive, according to the scenarios previously introduced in Section 3.
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Section 5.1 illustrates the equipment used in our experiments, Section 5.2 provides evidence of the
consistency among different observations of boot operations on the same USB flash drives, Section
5.3 shows the results achieved by MAGNETO in the classification of different brand and models
of USB flash drives, Section 5.4 illustrates how MAGNETO achieves the identification of single
USB flash drives using more advanced equipment, Section 5.5 provides the accuracy of MAGNETO
when a reduced number of features is selected, Section 5.6 includes some experiments on firmware
modification and, finally, Section 5.7 illustrates how the features of the host device impact on the
profile of unintentional magnetic emissions radiated by USB flash drives.
The code of MAGNETO, including the source data of our experiments and the tools necessary to
reproduce our results, are available for download at [13].
5.1 Tools and Methodology
In our experimental campaign, we used the equipment listed below.
• USB Devices. We tested the performance of MAGNETO with a set of total of 59 different
USB devices, related to 17 unique models, whose details are reported in Tab. 2, including the
model of the included Controller Chip, containing the local oscillator (mainly) responsible for
magnetic emissions generation (we notice that the manufacturer SanDisk does not provide
any detail about the controller chip). We selected these brands to create a large dataset,
Table 2. List of USB Brands and Models adopted in our experiments.
Device Controller Chip Device ID
HPx900w-64GB [20] PHISON-PS2251-09-V U1
JUANWE-32GB [22] FirstChip-FC1179 U2
Kingston Digital 16GB Data Traveler G4 [23] PHISON-PS2251-09-V U3
Mosdart-8GB [26] AlcorMP U4
PNY Turbo 128GB [34] PHISON-PS2251-09 U5
Patriot 128GB Supersonic Rage Series [32] PHISON-PS2251-09-V U6
Rubber Ducky [19] Atmel 32UC3B1 U7
Samsung BAR Plus 32GB [37] Silicon Motion SM3267 U8
SanDisk Ultra 128GB [38] SanDisk U9
SanDisk Cruzer 128GB [40] SanDisk U10
SanDisk Cruzer 32GB [42] SanDisk U11
SanDisk Cruzer 64GB [39] SanDisk U12
Silicon Power 32 GB Blaze B30 [45] PHISON-PS2251-09-26 U13
Toshiba TransMemory 64GB [51] PHISON-PS2251-11 U14
SanDisk 16 GB [41] SanDisk U15
Strontium 16 GB [46] Strontium U16
Klevv Neo C20 16GB [16] Essencore U17
considering both the most used models and any possible factor affecting the magnetic
emissions of such devices. Specifically, SanDisk, Samsung, and Kingston USB flash drives
are the top three brands purchased by users on Amazon—as of July 2019 [3]. At the same
time, Juanwe, PNY, HP, and Mosdart are all positioned among the top 10 brands. In addition,
we also selected some brands based on the use of the same version of the micro-controller.
For instance, we highlight that the micro-controller of the HP (U1), the Kingston (U3), the
PNY (U5), the Patriot (U6), the Silicon Power (U13), and the Toshiba (U14) are the same, i.e.,
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they feature the same hardware chip, while the layout of the PCB and/or the versions of the
firmware are different (e.g., 09-V for the Kingston, 09-26 for the Silicon Power) [33]. Also, it is
also worth noticing that we considered different devices having the same brand, model, and
firmware: specifically, we considered 15 SanDisk 16GB, 15 Strontium 16GB and 15 Klevv Neo
C20 16GB. All the devices have been analyzed as provided by the manufacturer, without any
modification to the legacy firmware. To prove the effectiveness of our method, we acquired
the magnetic emissions by temporarily removing the case of the USB flash drive. Besides, we
highlight the presence of a malicious device, i.e., a USB Rubber Ducky. This USB Flash drive
is a cross-platform keystroke injection tool, able to work effectively with either Windows,
Mac, or Linux. It features a 60 MHz 32-bit processor, hidden in the form factor of an ordinary
generic USB flash drive. It consists mainly of a CPU chip and a micro SD storage, used to
upload malicious payloads to the host device. Once connected to a host machine, the Rubber
Ducky is recognized as a keyboard. Thus, the host device accepts its payload, consisting of
pre-programmed regular keyboard strokes, up to a maximum rate of 1000 words per minute
[19]. The commands are programmed using a dedicated scripting language, and it is possible
to perform a wide range of automated functions, such as password brute-forcing, binaries
injection, shell reversing, as well as changing system settings. Nowadays, it is mainly used
by professionals, penetration testers, and system administrators.
• Aaronia PBS2 EMC Probe set. To collect the unintentional magnetic emissions radiated
by the USB devices, we used the Aaronia PBS2 EMC Probe set [1]. This equipment allows
straightforward pinpointing and measurement of interference in the frequency band from
the DC (1Hz) up to 9GHz in electronic component groups, as well as the execution and
monitoring of generic Electro-Magnetic measurement. As a probe, we used a 25mm magnetic
(H) field probe PBS-H3, covered with an insulating layer, thus providing a safe measurement
environment for oscillators and mains lines. This probe is connected to the UBBV2 40dB
EMC RF pre-amplifier, allowing for a clear separation between the useful signal and the
surrounding noise. The probe is then connected via a low-impedance cable to a SDR.
• HackRFOne Software Defined Radio. The HackRFOne SDR has been used to record
unintentional magnetic emissions acquired from the Probe Set over a frequency span of
10 MHz, and to convert raw data (in the form of regular I-Q samples) into spectral power
density measurements. Specifically, the SDR performs a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) on
the provided I-Q data and it generates, for each time frame, a tuple containing a reference
timestamp (in milliseconds), a frequency (in Hz), and a power level (in dBm). Tab. 3 provides
the details of the configuration of the SDR.
Table 3. Configuration of the HackRFOne Software Defined Radio.
Feature Value
Resolution Bandwidth 976.6 Hz
Center Frequency 5 MHz
Start Frequency 0 MHz
Stop Frequency 10 MHz
Reference Level -5 dB
FFT Size 8192 samples
• Rohde & Schwarz FSW8 Spectrum Analyzer. The Rohde & Schwarz FSW8 Spectrum
Analyzer has been used in place of the HackRFOne to record unintentional magnetic emissions
acquired from the Probe Set over a larger frequency span, up to 200 MHz. As with the
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HackRFOne, the equipment automatically converts raw data into spectral power density
measurements, by performing the FFT over the acquired samples, and it provides a tuple for
each time frame, containing a timestamp (in milliseconds), a frequency (in Hz) and a power
level (in dBm). Table 4 provides the details of the configuration of the spectrum analyzer.
Table 4. Configuration of the Rohde & Schwarz FSW8 Spectrum Analyzer.
Feature Value
Video Bandwidth 3 MHz
Resolution Bandwidth 3 MHz
Center Frequency 100 MHz
Start Frequency 0 MHz
Stop Frequency 200 MHz
Frequency Span 200 MHz
RF Attenuation 10 dB
Reference Level -5 dB
Sweep time 4.01 ms
Sweep points 4001
• Matlab R2020a. Matlab R2020a has been used to implement the Features Extraction Module,
the Training Module, the Local Database Module and the Classifier Module. As the classification
algorithm, we used the one-class SVM classifier provided by the Machine Learning Toolbox
of Matlab. Specifically, the one-class SVM classifier analyzes each of the USBs as a standalone
USB flash drive, by creating a profile that matches the features provided for the particular USB
brand (or the specific USB flash drive). When a test set is provided in input for classification,
as an output, the one-class SVM classifier provides an evaluation score for each input sample.
Such evaluation score indicates the likelihood that the specific input sample is consistent with
the created model, or not. This approach is particularly useful when the range of possible
classes is wide, such as for USB flash drives, and thus a multi-class classification approach is
not suitable.
All the experiments described in the following subsection have been conducted by collecting
the unintentional magnetic emissions radiated by the target USB devices in regular laboratory
conditions, without any effort to reduce the environmental noise. Our measurement setup is shown
in Figure 2.
Note that a USB cable extension was placed on a Bench Vise, to physically stabilize the USB
device under test. In addition, this setup allows having uniform conditions for emissions collection.
The Magnetic Probe has been placed on top of the USB device controller chip, in a way to clearly
capture the radiated emissions. For each USB device under test, ten different boot sequences were
acquired, where each measurement was at least 3.35 seconds long.
Finally, for the data processing, we used a Lenovo Ideapad 320 laptop, equipped with an Intel
i7-7500 processor running at 2.70 GHz and equipped with 8 GB of RAM.
5.2 Consistency of Unintentional Magnetic Emissions Radiated from USB Devices
Our first investigation aims at establishing the feasibility of uniquely identifying either the brand
and model of the USB flash drive or the specific USB device, based on the profile of the unintentional
magnetic emissions.
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Fig. 2. Measurements Setup.
Figure 3 shows two sample measurements acquired at different times, related to the unintentional
magnetic emissions radiated from the same Rubber Ducky USB flash drive (U7), during the boot
procedures. Because of the normalization phase occurring in the Features Extraction module, all the
samples corresponding to given times and frequencies have a value between 0 and 1. Specifically,
the blue color maps values in the range [0 − 0.25[, the cyan corresponds to values in the range
[0.25 − 0.5[, the yellow is related to values in the range [0.5 − 0.75[, while the red color indicates
value in the range [0.75 − 1].
Fig. 3. Profile of the unintentional magnetic emissions of a Rubber Ducky USB flash drive (U7), during two
different executions of the boot procedures.
First, we notice that the time duration of our experiments is enough to capture not only the boot
phase, where the whole system is powered up and initialized, but also to acquire the following idle
state, where the USB device waits for instructions by the target USB device.
By comparing the two figures, it emerges that different recordings have similar normalized
power profiles, as per the time and the frequency. Indeed, small differences can be found in the time
domain, due to a different delay between the time instant at which the acquisition was started and
the time instant where the USB device was connected to the host device, and in the intensity of the
unintentional radiation emissions, due to the surrounding noise and minimal displacement between
the USB device and the probe. However, even across different measurements, different acquisitions
of the unintentional radiated emissions from the same USB device are consistent, confirming that
their statistical analysis can be effectively used for discriminating the USB brand and model.
5.3 Scenario #1: Classification of USB flash drives brand and model
The Scenario #1 described in Section 3 involves the identification of the brand and model of the
specific USB Flash Drive under test. As shown in the previous section, different brands of USB
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Flash Drives are characterized by a very different profile of magnetic emissions. This motivates the
use of relatively cheap equipment, i.e., the HackRFOne SDR, as the tool for data acquisition and
processing. We recall that the HackRFOne has a maximum acquisition bandwidth of 10 MHz. Thus,
this frequency span can be used only to classify USB flash drives brands and models.
To enable cross-comparisons, we considered a fixed observation window of 1.08 seconds for
each of the acquired traces. This time-slot was further divided into a given number of time and
frequency regions, leading to a specific number of features characterizing each observation.
To provide sufficient robustness to the classification, we considered a total number of 325 features,
computed as follows. We first considered the overall observation interval of 1.08 seconds, and we
computed (5) features, i.e., the mean, standard deviation, variance, skewness, and kurtosis of the
samples in the whole interval (see Section 4 for the details of the computation of each feature). This
step results in a total of 5 features. Then, we further divided the overall observation interval of
1.08 seconds in four (4) time regions, each region lasting 0.27 s. For each time region, we computed
the same five (5) features listed above. This step results in a total of 20 features. Then, we further
divided each of the four (4) time regions into fifteen (15) frequency regions, where each frequency
region has a bandwidth of 666.67 Hz. For each of the 15 · 4 regions, we computed the same five (5)
features listed above. This step results in a total 15 · 4 · 5 = 300 features. Summing up the three
steps, we have a total of 5 + 20 + 300 = 325 features.
Specifically, the detection of authorized devices against not-authorized ones has been performed
resorting to the one-class SVM classifier (see Section 4 for more details). For the Scenario # 1, we
considered 17 different models of USB Flash Drives (classes), i.e., {U 1, . . . ,U 17}, and we performed
10 observations (measurements) for each class, for a total of 170 observations. Moreover, we adopted
the 10-fold cross-validation where, in each fold, 90% of the observations (from each class) have
been selected for the training process. Then, we test the remaining observations (10%) against the
models created for each USB flash drive (disjoint from the test set and therefore not containing any
testing sample), and we evaluate the accuracy of the model through a similarity score. Note that we
have 17 similarity scores for each testing sample, i.e., the score resulting from the evaluation of the
testing sample against each of the 17 classes (USB flash drives). Therefore, this strategy leads to a set
of 17 similarity scores for each testing sample, and a total number of 17·170 = 2, 890 similarity scores.
Figure 4 shows the computed similarity scores as a function of the 17 considered classes {U 1, . . . ,U 17}.
For each class (USB device), we reported as green (10 samples per class) the observations coming
from the authorized device, while we considered the red color (160 samples) for the non-authorized
ones.
It is worth noting that, in the vast majority of the experiments, the authorized USB flash drives
report values that are very close to 0 and less than the value of −0.01, while the unauthorized
ones report lower scores. Overall, given that the model of each USB flash drive is trained and
validated on its own, we should select a threshold value for each USB brand, and decide to accept it
as authorized if the evaluation score is higher than the threshold. As a worst-case, we notice that
selecting a general threshold T = −0.075 guarantees True Positives Ratio (TPR) 0.982 (i.e., 98% of
the authorized brands are correctly recognized), and a False Positives Ratio (FPR) of only 0.001
(i.e., only 0.01% of the unauthorized brands are erroneously recognized as authorized). However, a
threshold can be selected for each USB flash drive. For instance, focusing on the USB Flash Drive
U 7, the threshold value T7 = −0.0365 provides TPR 1 and FPR 0, i.e., the best possible result.
We remark that the above results show that MAGNETO can distinguish the brand and the model of
the USB flash drive, even if the brands share the same controller chip version and same PCB layout.
For instance, we can distinguish the specific USB flash drive model among the HPx900w-64GB, the
Kingston Digital 16GB Data Traveler G4, and the Patriot 128GB Supersonic Rage Series, despite
these three models share the same controller chip and PCB layout, i.e., the PHISON-PS2251-09-V.
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: August 2020.
MAGNETO: Fingerprinting USB Flash Drives via Unintentional Magnetic Emissions :15
Fig. 4. Classification performance of MAGNETO. Each column refers to a set of 170 experiments where just
one USB flash drive model is assumed to be authorized. Green markers report the value of the similarity
score of the classifier for the authorized device, while red markers report similarity score for the unauthorized
USB brands.
The above results suggested that, to some extent, MAGNETO can identify not only the specific
hardware chip but also the code that is executed during the boot. Indeed,MAGNETO can discriminate
also between the HP, Kingston, PNY, Patriot, Silicon Power, and Toshiba USB flash drives, even if
they are based on the same hardware chip. Indeed, we recall that their PCB and/or the version of the
firmware is different, and this leads to a different profile in the unintentional magnetic emissions at
lower frequencies during the boot operations. More details on the impact of the firmware running
on a particular chip will be provided in Section 5.6.
We also investigated the time required by MAGNETO to provide the decision. Using 325 features,
over a set of 2, 890 experiments, MAGNETO requires 11.5 ms on average, with a lower confidence
interval of 10.27 ms and higher confidence interval of 12.72 ms.
Finally, we notice that, in principle, any Machine-Learning (ML) and Deep Learning (DL) classi-
fication tool can be used to precisely classify the magnetic emissions radiated by the tested USB
Flash Drives. However, we highlight that the scope of our paper is not to find the best classification
tool for this problem, but to show that unintentional magnetic emissions can be used to fingerprint
the brand and the model of commodity USB Flash Drives. The data acquired from the tested USB
Flash Drives have been released as open-source, to give to interested researchers the opportunity to
test additional ML or DL classification tools and further boost the performance of MAGNETO[13].
5.4 Scenario 2: Identifying the specific USB Flash Drive
In the context of the Scenario #2, it is of crucial importance to uniquely identify the specific USB
flash drive, to protect the Critical Infrastructure against malicious software injection. As shown in
Section 5.2, identifying uniquely a USB Flash Drive involves discriminating very subtle differences
in the profile of the unintentional magnetic emissions, possibly spanning a wide spectrum. To
this aim, more powerful equipment should be used, characterized by a wider real-time bandwidth
resolution, such as the Rohde & Schwarz FSW8 Spectrum Analyzer, leading to an increased number
of features, that could be processed by a more powerful processing unit.
To investigate the feasibility of this setup of MAGNETO to uniquely identify USB Flash Drives,
we considered USB Flash Drives of the same brand and model, and we applied MAGNETO to
identify them uniquely. We considered a fixed observation window of 3.35 seconds for each of the
acquired traces, and the same number of features (325), derived as previously explained. Note that
the methodology to test the performance of MAGNETO is still the same previously described: in
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each experiment, we assumed a selected USB Flash Drive to be the allowed one, while the others
were assumed to be rejected, and we used the 10-fold cross-validation, where in each fold, 90%
of the recordings were used in the Training Mode, and the remaining 10% were used to test the
Classification Mode.
We considered three different USB Flash Drive brands: the SanDisk 16GB (U15), the Strontium
16GB (U16), and the Klevv Neo C20 16GB (U17), where 15 USB flash drives were available for each
experimentation. The results are reported in Figures 5, 6 and 7 for the SanDisk, the Strontium and
the Klevv Neo C20, respectively. Note that, now, each column contains 15 · 10 = 150 experiments,
where 10 experiments refer to the authorized USB flash drive and 140 experiments refer to the
unauthorized drives.
Figures 5-7 show that most of the (authorized) green circles are characterized by evaluation
Fig. 5. Classification accuracy ofMAGNETO considering 15 SanDisk 16GB USB Flash Drives.
Fig. 6. Classification accuracy of MAGNETO considering 15 Strontium 16GB USB Flash Drives.
scores higher than the red (unauthorized) circles. Generally speaking, the selection of the threshold
is a key component to determine the accuracy of the devised brands classification method. Low
values of the threshold guarantee zero false positives, i.e., no unauthorized brands are erroneously
recognized as authorized, but it also implies an increased number of false negatives, i.e., authorized
brands erroneously recognized as unauthorized, and thus experiencing a reduced number of True
Positives (correctly authorized brands). As a worst-case, we notice that selecting a common thresh-
old T = −0.09 for all the SanDisk, the Strontium, and the Klevv Neo, it is possible to guarantee a
True Positive Ratio of 0.946, 0.913, and 0.963, and a False Positive Ratio of 0.019, 0.027, and 0.012,
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Fig. 7. Classification accuracy of MAGNETO considering 15 Klevv Neo C20 16GB USB Flash Drives.
respectively. We notice that this is the worst-case, as a threshold can be selected appropriately for
each single USB Flash Drive. As an example, with the Strontium USB flash drive, an appropriate
choice of the thresholds for each flash drive (that can be done looking at Figure 6) can provide up to
TPR 0.94 and FPR 0.005. Overall, based on the specific USB flash drive, the network administrator
can setup MAGNETO in a way to achieve the best trade-off between the TPR and the FPR, to
minimize the false positives. In addition, the administrator can also suggest a specific brand to be
used for authentication, based on the achievable ratio between the TPR and the FPR.
Finally, we remark that discriminating against the specific USB device requires more powerful
equipment than a simple SDR. Specifically, the equipment to be used should be characterized by
a wide real-time resolution bandwidth, of about 200 MHz. Despite in our experimental assess-
ment we used the Rohde & Schwarz FSW8 spectrum analyzer, other cheaper devices are available,
characterized by a similar bandwidth range, with a price starting from as low as 500 USD.
5.5 Considerations on Features Reduction
As previously highlighted,MAGNETO requires a total number of 325 features to achieve the reported
performances. The reported number of features could appear high, with the risk of incurring in the
curse of dimensionality and subsequent model overfitting.
First, we highlight that the methodology adopted by MAGNETO is based on the split of the whole
data set into multiple disjoint training and test sets. Specifically, for each test, the model of each
USB Flash Drive is trained on 9 samples and tested on the remaining one. This approach is then
iterated, by testing each available sample as a test set (while the others serve as a training set). It
is worth noting that the model has not been updated after the testing, and we did not refine the
hyper-parameters of the one-class SVM classifier (being these two among the common sources of
overfitting). Therefore, we can reasonably exclude the hypothesis of overfitting.
However, to provide further insights, we investigated the effectiveness ofMAGNETO using a reduced
number of features, both for Scenario 1 and a reference example for Scenario 2. To determine
the critical features, we rank them with the help of the FEAST toolbox, which is a commonly
used feature ranking tool in machine learning [8]. This toolbox has been used also recently by the
authors in [10], to reduce the dimensionality of the features in the context of unintentional magnetic
emissions. The following Table 5 and Table 6 show the results of our investigation with a different
number of pre-dominant features, assuming the Scenario 1 (brand and model identification) and
the worst-case of Scenario 2 (USB authentication, 15 Strontium USB Flash Drives), respectively. In
the tables, we also report the correspondent selection of the threshold value (worst-case), set up to
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achieve the reported results.
We notice that the fluctuations of the results by increasing the number of features is limited. For the
Table 5. True Positive Ratio (TPR) and False Positive Ratio (FPR) of MAGNETO for the Scenario 1 (brand
and model identification), using an increasing number of pre-dominant features, obtained with the FEAST
toolbox.
No. of Features Threshold Value TPR FPR
10 T = -0.015 0.770 0.0003
20 T = -0.015 0.935 0.0014
50 T = -0.06 0.929 0.0018
100 T = -0.07 0.911 0.0025
200 T = -0.07 0.947 0.0029
300 T = -0.078 0.976 0.0051
325 T = -0.078 0.982 0.0022
Table 6. True Positive Ratio (TPR) and False Positive Ratio (FPR) of MAGNETO for the Scenario 2 (USB
authentication), in the case of 15 Strontium USB flash drives, using an increasing number of pre-dominant
features, obtained with the FEAST toolbox.
No. of Features Threshold Value TPR FPR
10 T = -0.8 0.753 0.040
20 T = -0.9 0.78 0.026
50 T = -0.9 0.78 0.026
100 T = -0.9 0.893 0.041
200 T = -0.93 0.893 0.028
300 T = -0.93 0.913 0.027
325 T = -0.93 0.913 0.027
Scenario 1, the most representative 20 features are enough to obtain a TPR of 0.93, with a negligible
fraction of false positive (FPR 0.0014). At the same time, for the case of Scenario 2, assuming to
work with the Strontium USB Flash Drives, 100 features are enough to obtain a TPR of 0.893, and
including more features has only a slight impact on the performance accuracy.
Based on the above considerations and results, we believe that we are both avoiding the curse of
dimensionality, and not overfitting the model.
5.6 Discussion on Firmware Modifications
As highlighted in Section 3, the firmware of commercial USB flash drives is usually protected by
multiple security layers, and cannot be modified. Despite several tutorials are available on media
and technical blogs regarding firmware modification of commercial USB flash drives, this is possible
only due to vulnerabilities affecting specific versions of the firmware of the USB flash drive. As a
direct consequence, the aforementioned vulnerabilities are usually (and immediately) fixed by the
vendor.
However, there are specific USB flash drives, such as the Rubber Ducky, whose firmware is specifi-
cally designed to be modified to achieve several tasks. These tasks can include benign operations,
such as the opening of a file, or malicious activities, such as the disabling of anti-virus software on
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the host, or the activation of passwords stealing tool.
To provide more insights on the performance of MAGNETO to identify modified firmware versions,
we investigated the effectiveness of our solution considering seven (7) different firmware versions
of the Rubber Ducky (U7):
• F1. Baseline default firmware used in Section 5.3, injecting an empty payload;
• F2. Firmware that opens a text file and types a single Hello World line;
• F3. Firmware that opens a text file and types 100 Hello World lines;
• F4. Firmware that opens a text file and types 200 Hello World lines;
• F5. Firmware that disables Windows Defender;
• F6. Firmware that inserts a delay of approximately 750 ms;
• F7. Firmware that steals browser-stored passwords.
First, we investigated the performance of MAGNETO to identify the above firmware modifications,
without any previous knowledge of their existence. To this aim, we used the models created for
the tests in Section 5.3, while the test set consisted of 10 acquisitions for the firmware versions
{F2, . . . , F7}. The results are reported in Figure 8. Note that all the circles are red, as the whole test
set samples are considered to be unauthorized.
First, we notice that for all the experiments that assume as authorized a USB flash drive that
Fig. 8. Classification accuracy of MAGNETO considering 6 modified versions of the boot firmware of the
Rubber Ducky USB Flash Drive (U7).
is different than the U7, report values that are lower than −0.01. Considering the configuration
of the threshold discussed in Section 5.3, these experiments all provide correct True Negative
outputs. Considering the USB flash drive U 7, we notice that, out of 50 experiments, 13 report
values that exceed the local threshold T = −0.0365, i.e., the local threshold value obtained from
the experiments in Section 5.3, providing FPR 0. These experiments correspond to the firmware
F2 (8 experiments) and F5 (5 experiments). Therefore, in the absence of any training on the
modified firmware versions, MAGNETO can discriminate a modified firmware only if the profile
of the corresponding EM emanations is consistently different from the trained one. When the
modifications are very little, such as for F2 and F5, the accuracy of MAGNETO decreases.
However, we notice that the accuracy of MAGNETO can be significantly enhanced by training on
the modified firmware versions. When this is possible (as for the Rubber Ducky), Figure 9 provides
the results of such a scenario, using the same procedure used for the previous sections.
It is worth noting that selecting the previously adopted threshold value, i.e. T = −0.07, MAGNETO
achieves FPR 0, i.e., it does not mislead any of the firmware versions with the native firmware
version F1 for the USB flash driveU 7.
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Fig. 9. Classification accuracy of MAGNETO considering 6 modified versions of the boot firmware of the
Rubber Ducky USB Flash Drive (U7), assuming to train on the modified firmware versions.
5.7 Host Device (Verifier) configuration and its impact onMAGNETO.
The analysis and results reported in the previous sections have been obtained using a single host
device, as detailed in Section 5.1. This is consistent with the two scenarios and the system model
assumed in our work. Indeed, both in a company (Scenario #1) and in a critical infrastructure
(Scenario #2), it is reasonable to assume that the system administrator has full control of the verifier,
i.e., the system used to acquire the fingerprints of the legitimate USB devices and to test new USB
devices. Moreover, it is reasonable and convenient for the system administrator that such a system
uses the same Operating System of the system(s) used within the site.
To provide further insights about the fingerprinting process, in this subsection, we extend our
analysis, investigating the consistency of the fingerprinting process when the hardware and the
software of the host devices change.
As a reference example, we investigated the consistency of the magnetic emissions radiated
during the boot process by a USB flash drive when different versions of the same OS are used on
the same machine. To this aim, we collected the unintentional magnetic emissions radiated during
the boot of a sample USB flash drive, i.e., the SanDisk Cruzer 128GB drive (U10), when connected to
the same machine used for the previous tests, operating with the Windows 7 and the Windows 10
OS. The former includes the version 6.1.7601.1910 of the USB driver, dating back to June 2006, while
the latter mounts the latest available version at the time of this writing, i.e., the version 10.0.18362.1
of the USB driver (March 2019). The profiles are shown in Fig. 10.
Fig. 10. Magnetic emissions of a USB flash drive (SanDisk Cruzer 128GB, U10), on (a) Windows 10 OS; and,
(b) Windows 7 OS.
Comparing the two figures, some small differences are noticeable, especially in the duration of
the different phases of the boot sequence. We remark that, while we report the figures only for the
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U 10 flash drive, the above-described behavior is common to all the USB flash drives analyzed in
our work.
Overall, these findings suggest that the construction of the Local Database (i.e., the training
process) and the Classification (i.e., the testing process) required by MAGNETO should be carried
out on the same system, guaranteeing both hardware and software consistency. When at least one
of these features changes, differences arise that, especially in the case of Scenario # 2, could lead to
undesired mismatches. Conversely, when the system administrator only requires the verification of
the brand and the model of the USB flash drive (Scenario # 1), fingerprints can be acquired and
tested by using different systems or different OSs.
We highlight that these findings are consistent with other related work on unintentional magnetic
emissions. Indeed, small modifications to the hardware and software features of involved devices
lead to different fingerprints.
Overall, our analysis demonstrates that the profile of the unintentional magnetic emissions
radiated during the boot procedure is mainly caused by the combination of four main elements:
(i) the memory readings/writings of the USB flash drive; (ii) the software instructions executed
by the microcontroller chip of the USB flash drive; (iii) the layout of the PCB of the USB flash
drive; and, (iv) the hardware and software features of the host device. This is confirmed by several
findings. Considering the samemicro-controller chip on a specific host, we have recorded completely
different profiles of unintentional magnetic emissions when considering different USB flash drives,
characterized by different layout of the PCB. This can be verified by looking at the profile of the
unintentional emissions of the devices HP (U1), Kingston (U3), PNY (U5), Patriot (U6), Silicon Power
(U13), and Toshiba (U14), sharing the same micro-controller chip but a different layout of the PCB.
In addition, as demonstrated by the above analysis, changing the hardware and the software of
the host device has a small yet noticeable impact on the fingerprints. When only the software of the
host changes, differences in the fingerprint of the same USB flash drive become more pronounced
due to a different interaction of the OS with the USB flash drive, affecting the final part of the boot
procedure. Considering different hardware (USB flash drive) on the same physical machine, we
also experienced small differences in the final part of the boot.
The discussion reported above highlights the effect of the hardware and the software of the host
device on the overall recorded fingerprint. However, we remark that the peculiarities associated
with the magnetic emissions are both out of the scope of our work and technically hard to achieve
when working with System-on-Chip (SoC), such as the USB flash drives. Indeed, matching the effect
of every single electronic component to the fingerprint would require isolating the effect of each of
them on the PCB of the specific USB flash drive. This is very hard to achieve both via hardware
and software. As for the hardware, disconnecting its components turns out to be very difficult to
achieve, in particular when working with SoC, such as the USB flash drives, where all the electronic
components are integrated on the same PCB. Disabling the components via software, instead, would
require having strict control over the firmware and the software of the USB flash drive. However,
they are not accessible by end-users and protected against source code reverse-engineering by
multiple security layers.
Overall, we can conclude that the differences among the brands and the devices of the same brand
are due to small circuits differences, as well as inaccuracies and imperfections in the manufacturing
process. On the one hand, the underlying process behind MAGNETO can be brought back to a
specific use-case of the Electro-Magnetic emanations of embedded circuits. On the other hand, we
would like to recall that our work aims to identify either the brand and the model or the specific
USB device, including all the interacting components, as a unique device. Thus, analyzing the effect
of each component of the leakage is out of scope for our work. We also remark that MAGNETO is
novel compared to other related work as, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, it is the first solution
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that can fingerprint USB flash drives in a non-interactive, minimal-invasive, and privacy-preserving
fashion, not requiring any intervention or modification on the devices under test.
We also highlight that MAGNETO can be further extended to interact with the host OS, to instruct
the sampling of the unintended magnetic emissions radiated by a connected USB flash drive
asynchronously, e.g., when a suspected activity is recorded by the host OS via software. In such
a scenario, it could be possible to compare the recorded profile of the specific USB flash drive in
regular operating conditions with the actual one, to identify eventual deviations. However, this
extension is left as future work. Finally, we highlight that our methodology, i.e., fingerprinting the
device as a whole, without considering the effect of the single components, is consistent with all
the related work investigating physical-layer fingerprinting and unintentional Electro-Magnetic
emissions, including [6, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 24, 36, 47, 53, 54]. The physical effects underpinning
these phenomena are described by the physics fundamental Maxwell equations, and also specific
mathematical models are available in the literature, describing their complex creation [7].
6 DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
The results presented in Section 5 clearly showed the effectiveness of MAGNETO. We showed that,
considering a specific host device, the unintentional magnetic emissions radiated at low frequencies
during the boot by a USB flash drive are: (i) very similar for devices of the same brands, (ii) unique
for each device, and (iii) consistent in time, thus being a viable and effective tool for USB brand
and device fingerprinting. For instance, assuming the reference scenario of a company, such as the
Scenario # 1 discussed in Section 3, the system administrator can enforce the use of only specific
brands and models of USB flash drive, eventually provided by the company itself. To this aim, the
system administrator can deploy MAGNETO on a dedicated machine, acquiring the profile of the
unintentional magnetic emissions of the selected USB flash drives, before their use. Then, in the
case of a company, on a selected period (e.g., once a day), every time a USB flash drive needs to
be used, the system administrator can plug the device into a dedicated laptop, connected to the
proposed MAGNETO system. Then, if the magnetic emissions at low frequencies during the boot
operations match the stored profile for the particular brand and model, the use of the particular
USB flash drive could be authorized; otherwise, it will not. Similarly, in a critical infrastructure,
such as in the Scenario # 2 discussed in Section 3, it is possible to deploy MAGNETO by using
powerful equipment, able to acquire the profile of the magnetic emissions on a wider frequency
span. As shown in Section 5.4, using such an increased frequency span can enhance the capabilities
of MAGNETO, to provide the identification of the specific USB drive.
Another feature of MAGNETO is its linear overhead, independent of the amount of USB flash drives
on the market. Indeed, the system administrator needs only to generate the profile (according
to the procedure detailed in the paper) of the USB he/she wants to add to the whitelist of the
authorized USB drives. Once the process committed, any USB drive that is screened requires just
the collection of the drive’s magnetic profile and its comparison against the profiles in the white-list.
The operation has a cost that is linear in the size of the white-list.
It is worth noting that the setup of MAGNETO is only aimed at protecting and ensuring the
authenticity of the boot procedures. This choice allows to timely detect a malicious adversary
that: (i) replaces the regular USB flash drive with another one having the same external look and
form factor, but a different hardware and (possibly malicious) firmware; and, (ii) can replace the
firmware of a legacy USB device with a brand new one, by inserting its own code. Such strategies
are common to the vast majority of USB attacks known today, as they are based on the complete
replacement of the hardware or the firmware of a regular USB device [28].
USB firmware tampering. Despite some USB flash drives are certified according to FIPS 140-2
Level 2 and Level 3 standards, USB flash drives cannot be considered as protected against tampering.
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As demonstrated in Section 5.6, the strength of MAGNETO lies in the inherent capability to detect
the tampering, as long as the modified firmware causes a profile of the unintended magnetic
emissions sufficiently different from the recorded one.
Indeed, the adversary might replace the firmware of the USB flash drive with a malicious one,
where just the minimum amount of lines have been modified to trigger a specific malware. Despite
MAGNETO can deal with these modifications by training on the modified firmware versions, we
highlight that both the executable file and the source code of the firmware on-board of commercial
USB flash drives are usually not modifiable and not accessible by the end-users after the deployment.
Even in the unlikely case where an adversary can obtain the file of the compiled firmware, it is hard
and impractical to reverse-engineer it to obtain the source code. Indeed, being always protected by
intellectual property rights, the source code of such firmware is also secret, protected by multiple
security layers deployed at manufacturing time, and not available for public download. Thus, it is
unfeasible to obtain it and to deploy the aforementioned attack.
Similarly, another adversarial strategy could consist in smartly modifying the firmware of the
legacy USB device, inserting just a code line that postpones the injection of the malicious code after
the execution of the boot procedures, i.e., when the USB drive goes in the idle state, waiting for
instructions by the host device. Despite the considerations previously done for the legacy firmware
modifications are still applicable to this attack, we also observe that MAGNETO can be extended
to detect the previously mentioned attack. By simply widening the observation window of the
Emissions Extraction Module and recording the unintentional magnetic emissions when the USB
device is in the idle state, MAGNETO can detect any anomalous operations initiated by the USB
device, raising an immediate alarm. Thus, MAGNETO can be extended to guarantee the safe usage
of any USB flash drive over an arbitrarily large time after the USB device has been connected to the
host system.
More powerful adversaries could adopt more sophisticated strategies. For instance, they could tie
the execution of the malicious code to a file transfer operation on the particular USB flash drive.
When a file is transferred to (or from) the drive, the malicious code is triggered. The effectiveness of
MAGNETO against this attack could still be achieved by fingerprinting also a file transfer operation,
assuming that a file transfer of a given size leads to the same profile of the unintended radiated
emission. To neutralize our countermeasure, the adversary could always trigger the execution of
the malicious code in a way to be tied to the size of the file to be transferred (e.g., greater than 10
MB). In this case, MAGNETO would be effective only if the profile of the unintentional magnetic
emissions for the specific file transfer operation has been recorded and profiled before, during the
Training Mode. It follows that fingerprinting all these operations would affect also the latency and
the usability of MAGNETO, increasing the testing time and the overall size of MAGNETO. However,
if the attack is triggered only when a specific file stored on the USB is opened, MAGNETO cannot
be effective without any previous fingerprinting process on that specific file.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed MAGNETO, a framework able to enhance the security level in the
usage of USB flash drives. Depending on the used equipment, MAGNETO can uniquely identify
either the brand and the model of commercial USB flash drives, or the specific USB flash drive,
by analyzing unintentional magnetic emissions radiated by the target USB devices during the
execution of the boot procedure. Through extensive experimental measurements on 59 different
USB drives—belonging to 17 brands, including the top brands purchased on Amazon in mid-2019—
we demonstrated that a USB flash drive can be fingerprinted by only looking at the magnetic
emissions unintentionally radiated during the boot procedure on a given host. When coupled with
a commercial low-cost Software Defined Radio such as the HackRFOne, MAGNETO can identify
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the specific brand and model of the USB flash drive with a minimum classification accuracy of the
98.2%, guaranteeing, at the same time, 0.01% false positives. When coupled with more expensive
equipment, characterized by a wide analysis bandwidth of at least 200 MHz, MAGNETO can also
identify the specific USB flash drive with a minimum classification accuracy of 91.3%. All the results
above can be obtained in almost real-time, analyzing a time-frame of at most 3.35 seconds and
requiring a negligible processing time (always less than 1 second on a standard laptop).
Thanks to the reported outstanding performance, MAGNETO emerges as a viable option to
strengthen the security of any sensitive computing equipment exposed to the threats posed by USB
drives, such as the one in a telco-backbone or a power plant, and in general contributing to the
security of critical infrastructure systems.
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